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Abstract— The participation of renewable energy sources in
energy markets is challenging, mainly because of the uncer-
tainty associated with the renewables. Aggregation of renewable
energy suppliers is shown to be very effective in decreasing this
uncertainty. In the present paper, we propose a cost sharing
mechanism that entices the suppliers of wind, solar and other
renewable resources to form or join an aggregate. In particular,
we consider the effect of a bonus for surplus in supply, which is
neglected in previous work. We introduce a specific proportional
cost sharing mechanism, which satisfies the desired properties
of such mechanisms that are introduced in the literature, e.g.,
budget balancedness, ex-post individual rationality and fairness.
In addition, we show that the proposed mechanism results in
a stable market outcome. Finally, the results of the paper are
illustrated by numerical examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Renewable energy resources are being widely employed
because of their cleanness and low marginal cost. Large pen-
etration of renewable energy is desirable in the future smart
grids, because of these advantages [1]. The drawback of
renewable energy sources is the uncertainty associated with
them, which is caused by the uncertainty of wind or solar
energy. There are subsidies for renewable energy suppliers in
current markets [1], [2], but such subsidies reduce the social
welfare in the electricity markets and should not be applied in
the future smart grids. Removing subsidies makes the future
electricity markets more competitive for renewable energy
producers, because they have to compete with other suppliers
in the market in equal conditions. In such a market the
uncertainty associated with renewable energy is a drawback.
Various studies show that the renewable energy produced in
different geographical areas often have negative correlation
and aggregating them reduces the amount of uncertainty
of these resources [3], [4]. However, aggregating renewable
energy suppliers is not possible without appropriate payment
sharing mechanisms. Renewable aggregation mechanisms are
considered within different system levels from small size
residential units [5] to the large scale microgrids [6]. These
mechanisms are often designed to result in a stable market
outcome, and incentivize suppliers to join the aggregate
by paying them more than what they earn outside the
aggregate. The desired properties that a payment sharing
mechanism should satisfy such as budget balancedness, ex-
post individual rationality and fairness are investigated in the
literature [7]–[9].
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A. Literature Review
Bitar et. al. [10], [11] addressed the problem of finding
the optimal bid for the aggregate using convex optimization
techniques. This work has been followed by [6]–[9], [12]
with introducing the contract game and designing payment
sharing mechanisms, which satisfy a list of properties and
result in stable market outcome. Baeyens et. al. [12] proposed
a payment sharing mechanism based on the expected wind
power production of each supplier, which depends on the
probability distribution of the power of the aggregate. They
also showed that the core of the coalitional contract game is
not empty, and that there exists at least one set of payments
that stabilizes the market. The payoffs for the suppliers are
calculated by solving a convex optimization problem that is
computationally demanding.
Nayyar et. al. proposed a payment sharing mechanism
that is based on each supplier’s performance rather than
the expected production [7]. This approach provides results
on the existence of Nash equilibria for the contract game
defined by this payment sharing mechanism, however it does
not optimize the payoff of the aggregate. In [8], a payment
sharing mechanism is proposed in which the payments are
based on the production of individual suppliers, and it
optimizes the payoff for the aggregate.
As an alternative to the above-mentioned mechanisms,
here is considered a proportional cost sharing mechanism,
which provides an intuitive measure of each supplier’s por-
tion in the total cost/bonus of the aggregate.
Lin et. al. [9] investigated the proportional cost sharing
mechanisms for renewable energy aggregation. They as-
sumed that the aggregate can avoid the excess of supply.
The effect of energy surplus for aggregate is neglected in
their analysis. Even though tools such as demand response
and storage can be employed to manage power excess in the
grid, the effect of surplus cannot be completely neglected in
designing cost sharing mechanisms.
B. Contributions and Outline
In this paper, we propose a proportional cost sharing
mechanism. This cost sharing mechanism is proved to satisfy
the desired properties such as budget balancedness, ex-post
individual rationality and fairness. The main contribution of
the paper is that we consider surplus for the aggregate, and
a bonus for surplus is allowed in our analysis.
In addition, we study the existence of Nash equilibria
for the contract game defined by proposed cost sharing
mechanism, which becomes more challenging when the
effect of bonus is considered.
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The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section II,
the forward electricity market model utilized in this work
is described. The proportional cost sharing mechanisms and
the effect of adding bonus for the surplus of energy are
studied in Section III. The contract game and the results
on the existence of Nash equilibria are drawn in Section IV.
Two illustrative examples are discussed in Section V, and
conclusions are made in Section VI.
II. MODEL
Notation: In this work, x ∈ Rn represents a vector.
We denote the max{0, x} with [x]+, and the set of natural
numbers up to s is indicated by Ns. The set of positive real
numbers are denoted by R+
A. Market Structure
We consider a forward electricity market model that is
very similar to the one used in [9]. The market considered
here is perfectly competitive, meaning that no supplier or
consumer can affect the market clearing price. In such a
market, consider an aggregate with a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
of n suppliers. Each supplier i ∈ N offers a contract
ci, which represents her commitment of producing ci units
of energy for a given time period in future. Consider an
aggregate with n suppliers offering contracts. The market
model contains the following two steps:
• ex-ante: The price of unit of energy is denoted by
f(cˆtot), where f : R+ → R+ and cˆtot is the total
contract submitted to system operator. The price is
announced by the system operator for a specific trading
period. In this step, all the suppliers offer their contracts
to the aggregate manager. The contract profile c =
[c1, . . . , cn] contains all the individual contracts. The
feasible set for the contract of supplier i is [0, ci,max],
where ci,max indicates the nameplate capacity of sup-
plier i. Clearly the sets of contracts for the suppliers
are compact and convex. The feasible set for supplier i
is denoted by Ci and the set of all possible contract
profiles is represented by C = C1 × C2 × . . . × Cn.
Clearly, the set C is also a compact and convex set.
In addition, we assume that the aggregate contract is
the sum of individual contracts: c =
∑n
i=1 ci [7], [10].
Furthermore, assume that all the suppliers within the
aggregate have the same a priori information about the
imbalance prices, therefore, identical estimations. Our
analysis is based on these estimated imbalance prices.
• ex-post: This step occurs after the trading period, where
each supplier realizes an amount of production, e.g.,
for supplier i the production amount is wi ∈ Ci. The
supply profile is denoted by w = [w1, . . . , wn] and
the aggregate supply is w =
∑n
i=1 wi. Consider F :
C → [0, 1] as the joint probability distribution of the
supply profile on w and Fi : Ci → [0, 1] as its marginal
distribution on wi.
Remark 1: The imbalance prices are not announced until
the ex-post step. However, suppliers need to have some a
priori information about those prices to be able to choose
the right strategy in the forward market. We will assume
that θ = (q, λ) is the pair of expected imbalance prices,
where q > 0 is the penalty associated with the shortfall and
λ is the penalty (λ < 0) or bonus (λ ≥ 0) for surplus in
production. A potential future path is to extend the analysis
proposed in this paper to consider the effect of uncertainty
in the estimates of the imbalance prices, when all suppliers
have the same or different a priori information.
Remark 2: Throughout the paper, we refer to negative cost
as bonus.
Let us denote the deviation from the contract for each
supplier with di = ci − wi and the deviation profile with
d = [d1, d2, . . . , dn]. The deviation of the aggregate from its
contract, then is represented by d =
∑n
i=1 di. The expected
payoff of the aggregate from the system is obtained from:
pi(c) = f(cˆtot)c− E[S(d, θ)], (1)
where S(d, θ) represents the cost to the aggregate charged
by the system operator for d units of energy deviation from
the contract, based on the set of expected imbalance prices
θ. Since we assumed that θ is deterministic, the expectation
is with respect to d, which depends on w that is not known
in the ex-ante market.
B. System Cost Function
In the present work, we assume the following cost function
for the system, which is also leveraged elsewhere, e.g. [9]:
S(d, θ) = q[d]+ − λ[−d]+. (2)
There are other cost function models utilized in the literature
[7], [8], [11]. The generalization of the results of this paper
can be investigated on other types of cost functions, which
is subject to future work.
III. PROPORTIONAL COST SHARING MECHANISM
The aggregate cost function is used by the aggregate to
share the realized cost/bonus, S(d, θ), among the suppliers
based on their individual deviations from the submitted con-
tract. The aggregate cost function is not necessarily the same
as the system cost function. In this work, we consider a class
of aggregate cost functions that are known as proportional
cost functions, and we define them as follows:
Definition 1: The proportional cost sharing mechanism is
a mapping φ from Rn ×R2 ×J corresponding to deviation
profile, d, the pair of imbalance prices, θ, and the set of
admissible cost functions, J , into Rn, where the cost share
for supplier i, φi(d, θ, J), is defined as:
φi(d, θ, J) =
J(d, θ)∑n
j=1 J(dj , θ)
J(di, θ). (3)
An admissible cost function, J ∈ J , results in a propor-
tional cost sharing mechanism φi(d, θ, J) that satisfies the
following properties:
1) Budget balanced:
∑n
i=1 φi(d, θ, J) = S(d, θ)
2) Ex-post individual rationality: If S(di, θ) ≥ 0, then
φi(d, θ, J) ≤ S(di, θ)
3) No exploitation: φi(d, θ, J) = 0, when di = 0.
4) Fairness: if di = dj , then φi(d, θ, J) = φj(d, θ, J).
Notation: Note that J is a function of the deviation profile,
the net deviation of aggregate and the imbalance prices. For
the sake of simplicity in the notation, we denote it with two
arguments as J(di, θ).
The properties mentioned above are used as desired prop-
erties of a cost sharing mechanism in the literature [7]–[9],
[11]. There is one more property that is introduced in [9] for
the case with no bonus, λ < 0, which is called monotonicity.
We define the monotonicity for the general choice of λ,
where it can be negative or positive.
Definition 2: Let ∆+ = {i ∈ N|di ≤ 0} represent the
indices for suppliers with surplus, and ∆− = {i ∈ N|di >
0} the indices for suppliers with shortfall. Consider the
following two cases:
• λ ≤ 0: φi(d, θ, J) satisfies monotonicity, if for any
i, j ∈ ∆+ or i, j ∈ ∆− such that |di| ≥ |dj |, we have
φi(d, θ, J) ≥ φj(d, θ, J).
• λ > 0: φi(d, θ, J) satisfies monotonicity, if for any
i, j ∈ ∆+ such that di ≤ dj or i, j ∈ ∆− such that
|di| ≥ |dj |, we have φi(d, θ, J) ≥ φj(d, θ, J).
Monotonicity can be interpreted as a fairness condition such
that if a positive or negative deviation is penalized, the
supplier with more deviation has to be penalized no less than
a supplier with less deviation, and if surplus is appreciated
by bonus, the bonus for a supplier with more surplus must
not be less than the bonus for one with less surplus. Clearly,
monotonicity is a desired property.
A. Choice of Cost Function
In this section, we consider two candidates for cost func-
tion J , and study the advantages and drawbacks of each one.
1) Candidate 1: The first candidate that comes into mind
is the system cost function, S(d, θ). We indicate this function
by J˜ , and define it as follows:
J˜(di, θ) = q[di]
+ − λ[−di]+. (4)
The proportional cost sharing mechanism with this choice of
cost function has the following form:
φi(d, θ, J˜) = α(d)(q[di]
+ − λ[−di]+), (5)
where
α(d) =
q[d]+ − λ[−d]+
q
∑n
j=1[dj ]
+ − λ∑nj=1[−dj ]+ . (6)
Proposition 1: According to Def. 1, the cost sharing
mechanism φi(d, θ, J˜) is a proportional cost sharing mech-
anism, if λ ≤ 0.
Proof: Let us check each property separately:
• Budget balanced: Clearly,
n∑
i=1
φi(d, θ, J˜) =
J˜(d, θ)∑n
j=1 J˜(dj , θ)
n∑
i=1
J˜(di, θ)
= J˜(d, θ) = S(d, θ).
• Ex-post individual rationality: By replacing J˜(di, θ)
with S(di, θ), we have:
φi(d, θ, J˜) =
q[d]+ − λ[−d]+
q
∑n
i=1[di]
+ − λ∑ni=1[−di]+S(di, θ).
We also know that the following two inequalities hold:
n∑
i=1
[di]
+ ≥
[ n∑
i=1
di
]+
= [d]+
n∑
i=1
[−di]+ ≥
[ n∑
i=1
−di
]+
= [−d]+.
Hence, if λ < 0, then
q[d]+ − λ[−d]+
q
∑n
i=1[di]
+ − λ∑ni=1[−di]+ ≤ 1,
=⇒ φi(d, θ, J˜) ≤ S(di, θ).
• No exploitation: This is clearly satisfied because if
di = 0, then J˜(di, θ) = 0, hence φi(d, θ, J˜) = 0. Note
that for the case that all the deviations are zero, the
denominator becomes zero. For this particular case, we
define φi(d, θ, J˜) separately to be zero.
• Fairness: Based on the form of the cost function, J˜ ,
we know that, if di = dj , then J˜(di, θ) = J˜(dj , θ).
Therefore:
J˜(d, θ)∑n
j=1 J˜(dj , θ)
J˜(di, θ) =
J˜(d, θ)∑n
i=1 J˜(di, θ)
J˜(dj , θ).
The equality above is obtained by noticing that the two
fractions of both sides are identical, and J˜(di, θ) =
J˜(dj , θ). Then, we have
φi(d, θ, J˜) = φj(d, θ, J˜).
Clearly, if λ ≤ 0, then φ(d, θ, J˜) satisfies the monotonicity
property as well. In other words, if there is no bonus in the
market, it can be claimed that J˜ is a decent choice for the
cost function, because it satisfies all of the desired properties
mentioned in Def. 1 as well as monotonicity. However, if we
consider the effect of bonus, one can immediately see that
J˜ is not even a valid proportional cost sharing mechanism
according to Def. 1, because it does not necessarily satisfy
ex-post individual rationality property. We illustrate this with
the following example.
Example 1: Assume λ > 0, and the deviations of the
suppliers from their contracts are such that the following
holds:
q
n∑
i=1
[di]
+ − λ
n∑
i=1
[−di]+ = ,
where  > 0. Considering the fact that λ > 0, one can see
that  can be very small. On the other hand, assume that the
total deviation of the aggregate is d˜ > 0, then S(d, θ) = qd˜.
Now, as we can make  arbitrarily small, let  = qd˜2 . The
share of supplier i is obtained as follows:
φi(d, θ, J˜) =
qd˜
qd˜
2
J˜(di, θ) = 2S(di, θ) > S(di, θ) if di > 0,
which contradicts the ex-post individual rationality property.
Similar analysis can be performed to show the dissatisfaction
of the monotonicity property, when bonus is considered.
The above-mentioned problems motivate us to investigate
other alternatives that can satisfy all the desired properties
for proportional cost sharing mechanisms.
2) Candidate 2: Here, we propose the second candidate
cost function:
J∗(di, θ) = I(d≥0)q[di]+ − I(d<0)λ[−di]+, (7)
where I represents the indicator function that is 1 when
the condition in subscript is satisfied and zero otherwise.
Intuitively, the cost function introduced above penalizes
supplier i only if she increases the cost of the aggregate.
In other words, if a supplier has a shortfall in energy, she is
only penalized if the aggregate also incurs shortfall. On the
other hand, if there is bonus for surplus, then the bonus is
shared only amongst the suppliers with surplus.
The proportional cost sharing mechanism with cost func-
tion J∗ has the following form.
φi(d, θ, J
∗) =

β+(d)(qdi) if di ≥ 0 & d ≥ 0
β−(d)(λdi) if di < 0 & d < 0
0 otherwise
, (8)
where
β+(d) =
d∑n
i=1[di]
+
, β−(d) =
−d∑n
i=1[−di]+
. (9)
Proposition 2: The cost sharing mechanism φi(d, θ, J∗)
is a proportional cost sharing mechanism according to Def. 1
regardless of the choice of λ. In addition, it satisfies mono-
tonicity.
Proof: Let us check all the properties separately.
Budget balanced: similar to the proof of budget balanced in
Proposition 1:
n∑
i=1
φi(d, θ, J
∗) =
J∗(d, θ)∑n
j=1 J
∗(dj , θ)
n∑
i=1
J∗(di, θ) = J
∗(d, θ)
= S(d, θ).
Ex-post individual rationality: First, consider the following
fact:
S(di, θ) =
{
qdi if di ≥ 0
λdi if di < 0
.
Then we can write the cost sharing mechanism as follows:
φi(d, θ, J
∗) = β(d)S(di, θ)
where β(d) is defined as:
β(d) =

β+(d) if di ≥ 0 & d ≥ 0
β−(d) if di < 0 & d < 0
0 otherwise
.
Moreover, we know that the following two inequalities hold:
n∑
i=1
[di]
+ ≥
[ n∑
i=1
di
]+
= [d]+
n∑
i=1
[−di]+ ≥
[ n∑
i=1
−di
]+
= [−d]+,
which means β(d) ≤ 1 for all the cases. Now consider all
the possible cases:
1) di ≥ 0 & d ≥ 0: In this case, clearly φi(d, θ, J∗) ≤
S(di, θ).
2) di < 0 & d < 0: Again as β(d) ≤ 1, φi(d, θ, J∗) ≤
S(di, θ).
3) di > 0 & d < 0: In this case, φi(d, θ, J∗) = 0 ≤
S(di, θ).
4) di < 0 & d > 0: In this case we should consider two
cases: a) λ > 0: then S(di, θ) < 0, b) λ < 0, which
concludes that φi(d, θ, J∗) = 0 ≤ S(di, θ).
As we can see for all possible cases the ex-post individual
rationality is satisfied.
No exploitation: This is clearly satisfied because
J∗(di, θ) = 0 if di = 0.
Fairness: Note that d is the same for both suppliers i and j,
hence J∗(di, θ) = J∗(dj , θ). The rest of the proof is similar
to the proof of fairness in Proposition 1.
Monotonicity: Consider the following cases:
1) i, j ∈ ∆−: Then for k ∈ {i, j}, we have
φk(d, θ, J
∗) = β(d)qdk, then if di ≥ dj , then
β(d)qdi ≥ β(d)qdj . Note that β(d) is same for both
suppliers.
2) i, j ∈ ∆+: Then for k ∈ {i, j}, we have
φk(d, θ, J
∗) = β(d)λdk, assume |di| ≥ |dj |, then if
λ ≤ 0, then β(d)λdi ≥ β(d)λdj , and if λ > 0, then
β(d)λdj ≥ β(d)λdi.
Next, we turn our attention to the contract game composed
of the proposed cost sharing mechanism, and the market
properties associated with this contract game.
IV. CONTRACT GAME AND EXISTENCE OF NASH
EQUILIBRIA
A. Contract Game Formulation
The contract game G(N , C, pi) inside an aggregate is
defined by the following elements:
• Players: set of all suppliers: N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• Strategies: set of feasible strategies, C, which is assumed
to be convex and compact.
• Payoffs: payoff for supplier i is defined as:
pii := f(cˆtot)ci − E[φi(d, θ, J)]
and pi = [pi1, . . . pin] is the payment profile.
We assume perfect competition in the market, which
means that f(cˆtot) is independent of c. In other words, the
total supply of the aggregate is negligible compared to the
whole grid. In practice, the market clearing price for a trading
period, is known before the dispatch process.
Assumption 1: For the remainder of paper, we explicitly
assume: f(cˆtot) = p, where p is a constant. In order to avoid
trivial market outcome, we also assume: |λ| < p < q.
B. Existence of Nash equilibria
In the game theory and mechanism design, one of the
desired properties that a game leveraging the designed mech-
anism is required to satisfy is the existence of at least one
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. A pure strategy defines a
specific move or action that a player will follow in every
possible attainable situation in a game. Such moves may not
be random, or drawn from a distribution. A pure strategy
Nash equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 3: A set of pure strategies is called a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium if no player can increase their
payoffs by unilaterally changing their strategies [13].
With a slight abuse of notation, we call the market with
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, a stable market. In what
follows, we check whether or not the cost sharing mechanism
defined by φi(d, θ, J∗) constitutes a stable market. The
answer to this question is provided by Theorem 1, which
is the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1: Under Assumption 1, the contract game G =
(N , C,pi) defined by the proportional cost sharing mech-
anism with cost function J∗, and the set of convex and
compact strategies C has at least one pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
Remark 3: It can be shown that the game defined by cost
sharing mechanism φ(d, θ, J˜) does not necessarily have a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, if λ is positive. Additionally,
the proportional cost sharing mechanism, φ(d, θ, J˜) penal-
izes the suppliers who decreased the cost of the aggregate
in certain cases, which is not desired. On the other hand,
the contract game described by φ(d, θ, J∗), constitutes at
least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium regardless of the
sign of λ, and does not penalize suppliers whose deviations
compensate for the net shortfall of the aggregate.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide two examples, which illustrate
the results on the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium for the contract game. In the first example, there is
no bonus for overproduction. In this example, our goal is to
illustrate that the expected payoff function for supplier i is
concave in ci. The second example shows that if there is a
bonus in the market, the proportional cost sharing mechanism
proposed here also results in a contract game with a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. Additionally, for the case that
λ > 0, we illustrate that the expected payoff function of
supplier i is quasi-concave in ci.
Consider an aggregate of two wind suppliers with the
following wind power probability distributions:
w1 =
{
1 w.p. 0.7
2 w.p. 0.3
, w2 =
{
1 w.p. 0.3
2 w.p. 0.7
. (10)
The market clearing price is set to be p = 0.5 and the
expected penalty price for surplus is q = 1.5. The set of
feasible contracts for the two players are C1 = C2 = [0, 2].
In order to verify the results of Theorem 1, we calculate
the Nash equilibrium of the game with cost sharing mecha-
nism defined by φ(d, θ, J∗) for two cases: λ > 0 and λ < 0.
Example 2: Consider the aggregate described by (10).
Assume the cost for energy surplus is negative, i.e. λ =
−0.4. The payoffs are calculated by using cost function pii.
Fig. 1.(a) and 1.(b) illustrate the expected payoffs for supplier
1 and 2 versus the strategies of the two players. There exists a
unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this example game
at (c1, c2) = (1, 2), and the payoffs for the two suppliers
at the Nash equilibrium are: (pi1, pi2) = (0.416, 0.685).
Fig. 1.(c) illustrates the first supplier’s payoff, when c2 is
fixed at 1.5. Clearly pi1 is concave in c1 and pi2 is concave
in c2.
Fig. 1. (a): supplier 1’s payoff vs. c. (b): supplier 2’s payoff vs. c.
(c): illustration of concavity of the payoff of supplier 1 in c1 at c2 = 1.5.
Fig. 2. (a): supplier 1’s payoff vs. c. (b): supplier 2’s payoff vs. c.
(c): illustration of quasi-concavity of the payoff of supplier 1 in c1 at c2 =
1.5.
Example 3: Consider the same example, but change the
value of surplus imbalance price to λ = 0.4. The payoffs for
supplier 1 and 2 versus the strategies of the two players are
shown in Fig. 2.(a) and 2.(b). The Nash equilibrium for this
game occurs at (c1, c2) = (2, 1) and the pair of payoff values
for the two players are (pi1, pi2) = (0.685, 0.584). One can
see that the payoff functions pii are quasi-concave in ci and
continuous in both c1 and c2. If we use λ = 0.25 in this
example, there will be infinitely many Nash equilibria on a
line segment with equation c2 = 3− c1, c1, c2 ∈ [1 2].
VI. CONCLUSION
Aggregation of Renewable energy resources is proved to
be effective for reducing the uncertainty associated with
renewables. In this paper, we used a generalized model of
energy markets where surplus of energy is allowed, and the
effect of bonus for surplus is considered. Then a proportional
cost sharing mechanism is proposed for the generalized
market model. This cost sharing mechanism entices the
renewable suppliers to join the aggregate, by increasing their
payoff compared to when they bid directly to the system
operator. It also satisfies the desired properties such as budget
balancedness, fairness and monotonicity. Additionally, the
net cost of the aggregate is shared among the suppliers
proportional to their part in the total cost. In addition, it
is proved that the contract game, which leverages this cost
sharing mechanism results in at least one pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
Generalization of the results of this paper to the markets
with different system cost functions, e.g., the cost function
that calculates the real-time deviation rather than the average,
is an interesting future direction. Furthermore, the quality of
obtained Nash equilibrium can be evaluated by exploiting
measures of efficiency loss [14], [15].
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Let us first present some preliminary results
from convex optimization and game theory literature.
A. Convex optimization results
Lemma 1: [16] Let f(c, w) : C × C → R be a differen-
tiable function, where C is a convex and compact set. Then
F (c) =
∫
C
f(c, w)dw
is differentiable and dF (c)dc =
∫
C
∂f(c,w)
∂c dw.
Lemma 2: If a function h(x, y) is convex in x, then the
expectation of h, E[h(x, y)], with respect to y is also convex
in x.
Lemma 3 (Section 3.4 in [17]): Let f : C → R be a
differentiable function on C , where C ⊂ Rn is convex and
compact. Then f is quasi-concave on the interior of C if and
only if ∀cˆi, ci ∈ C:
f(cˆi)− f(ci) ≥ 0 =⇒ ∂(f(c))
∂c
∣∣∣∣
c=ci
(cˆi − ci) ≥ 0.
B. Game theoretic results
A (quasi-)concave game is a game in which, the payoff
function for each player is (quasi-)concave in her strategy.
Lemma 4: (Debreu, Glicksberg, Fan) [18], [19] A game
G(N , C,pi) with compact and convex set of strategies, C,
admits at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium, if the
payoff functions pii for all i ∈ N are continuous in c and
quasi-concave in ci.
C. Main proof
Notation: We denote every index except i with subscript
−i. Also, for the sake of simplicity of the proof, we present
functions with respect to ci and wi instead of deviation di.
Consider two cases:
1. λ ≤ 0
By Lemma 4 the proof reduces to showing that pii(c) is
continuous in c and concave in ci for all i ∈ N .
With Assumption 1: pii(c) = pci − E[φi(d, θ, J∗)]. pci
is affine in ci so it suffices to show that E[φi(d, θ, J∗)] is
convex in ci. Define:
α =
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
(dj), αn =
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
(dj)
+, αp =
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
(−dj)+.
Clearly α = αn − αp. The proportional cost sharing
mechanism can be written as follows:
φi(d, θ, J
∗) =

q (ci−wi+α)(ci−wi)ci−wi+αn If c ≥ w, ci ≥ wi
λ (ci−wi+α)(ci−wi)ci−wi−αp If c < w, ci < wi
0 Otherwise
.
This function is continuous in C for both c and w. The next
step is to show that φi(c, w) is convex in ci. Consider the
following cases:
a) c ≥ w, ci ≥ wi: Let
g1(c,w) =
(α+ ci − wi)(ci − wi)
ci − wi + αn .
The first and second derivatives are
∂g1(c, w)
∂ci
=
(ci − wi)2 + 2αn(ci − wi) + ααn
(ci − wi + αn)2 ,
∂2g1(c, w)
∂c2i
=
2αn(ci − wi + αn)(αn − α)
(ci − wi + αn)4 .
Clearly the second derivative is positive, so qg1(c, w) is
convex in ci for this region.
b) c < w, ci < wi: Let
g2(c,w) =
(ci − wi + α)(ci − wi)
ci − wi − αp .
The first and second derivatives are
∂g2(c, w)
∂ci
=
(ci − wi)2 − 2αp(ci − wi)− ααp
(ci − wi − αp)2
∂2g2(c, w)
∂c2i
= −2αp(wi − ci + αp)(αp + α)
(ci − wi − αp)4 .
Clearly for c < w, ci < wi,
∂2g2(c,w)
∂c2i
≤ 0, hence for λ ≤ 0,
the function λg2 is convex in ci for this region. For the
other scenarios in c,w space, φi is zero. Therefore, φi is a
piecewise function, which is continuous and is convex in ci
in its domain, which implies that φ(d, θ, J∗) is convex in ci.
By Lemma 2, E[φi(d, θ, J∗)] is also convex in ci. This
implies concavity of pci − E[φi(d, θ, J∗)]. Therefore, the
contract game G is concave, and has at least one pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
2. λ > 0
Without loss of generality, we assume the following:
• The distribution function, F (w), is integrable in the
domain C.
Remark 4: For discrete probability mass function, F˜ (w)
the proof is similar, except that the integrals are replaced
with sums.
Define three regions for ci as:
R1 If ci ≤ min{wi, wi + α}
R2 If min{wi, wi + α} ≤ ci ≤ max{wi, wi + α}
R3 If ci ≥ max{wi, wi + α}
.
Let us first consider pˆii(d, θ, J∗) = Ew
[
pci−φi(d, θ, J∗)
]
.
The objective is to show that this function is quasi-concave.
This function is defined as:
pˆii(d, θ, J
∗
) =

∫
W1
[
pci − λ (ci−wi+α)(ci−wi)(ci−wi−αp)
]
F (w)dw If ci ∈ R1∫
W2 pciF (w)dw If ci ∈ R2∫
W3
[
pci − q (ci−wi+α)(ci−wi)ci−wi+αn
]
F (w)dw If ci ∈ R3
,
where Wi denotes the set of power profiles that cause ci
to be in Ri. If ci ∈ R1, then we show that the function
pˆii is monotonically non-decreasing in ci. We calculate the
derivative as:∫
W1
[
p− λ (ci − wi)
2 − 2αp(ci − wi)− ααp
(ci − wi − αp)2
]
F (w)dw.
We used Lemma 1 to derive the above equation. Inside the
integral can be written as the following:
(p− λ)(ci − wi)2 + (λ− p)αp(ci − wi)
(ci − wi − αp)2
+
λαp(ci − wi + α)− pαp(ci − wi − αp)
(ci − wi − αp)2
≥ 0, in R1,
because p > λ and ci −wi −αp ≤ ci −wi +α ≤ 0. This
proves that pˆii(d, θ, J∗) is monotonically non-decreasing in
region R1.
Now consider ci ∈ R2. In this case, the derivative inside
the integral is p ≥ 0. Hence, pˆii(d, θ, J∗) is monotonically
increasing in region R2.
Finally, from the proof for λ ≤ 0, we know that
pˆii(d, θ, J
∗) is concave in R3. Observe that pˆii(d, θ, J∗)
is a continuous function in ci. Consider the following two
functions:
ti,1(d, θ, J
∗
) =

∫
W1
[
pci − λ (ci−wi+α)(ci−wi)(ci−wi−αp)
]
F (w)dw If ci ∈ R1∫
W2 pciF (w)dw If ci ∈ R2
0 If ci ∈ R3
.
ti,2(d, θ, J
∗
) =

0 If ci ∈ R1
0 If ci ∈ R2∫
W3
[
pci − q (ci−wi+α)(ci−wi)ci−wi+αn
]
F (w)dw If ci ∈ R3
.
It is straightforward to show that both ti,1 and ti,2 are quasi-
concave functions by using Lemma 3. A quasi-concave func-
tion increases to a peak and decreases afterwards. The point-
wise maximum of quasi-concave functions is also quasi-
concave (Chapter 3 in [17]). Therefore, pˆii = max{ti,1, ti,2}
is a quasi-concave function. Finally, note that pii(d, θ, J∗) =
pˆii(d, θ, J
∗), hence it is quasi-concave. By Lemma 4, the
contract game G = (N , C, pi) is a quasi-concave game and
has at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
